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Appendices

Israel's security since the Oslo Accords (5/5)

The Third Netanyahu Government
18 March 2013 ‐ 14 May 2015

Prisoner release gestures

With the start of his third government, Netanyahu surrendered to heavy American pressure exerted by the Obama administration, and as a gesture to Abu Mazen and without any recompense on his part, he asked the government to pass a decision to release many other terrorists in four "stages". The decision to implement the release was passed by the government, and three of the four "stages" took place.

The kidnapping of the three boys

Mahmud Qawasmeh from Hebron was released in the Shalit deal[66]. On 12 June 2014, Kawasmeh initiated the kidnapping of the three youths of Gush Etzion Yeshiva – Gil Sha'ar, Naftali Frenkel and Eyal Yifrah ‐ Hy"d. Kawasmeh served as the commander of the kidnapping and murder squad. The search for the boys developed when there was no option of an operation to clean out Hamas nests in Judea and Samaria, which grew stronger after the Shalit deal. In response, Hamas began massive rocket fire and attacks via tunnels dug from the Gaza Strip into Israeli territory using the very building materials that Israel had transferred to Gaza as humanitarian aid.

Once again, Israel found itself trapped in the same Oslo trap, caught in another "round of fighting," without a moral infrastructure that would support the fighters and without the ability to define the enemy and then designate its destruction as an objective – and therefore unable to win.

Tzuk Eitan

At the beginning of the fighting, the objective of the operation was defined as "stopping the rocket fire," while later, when Hamas began to attack through tunnels, the goal was changed to "liquidating the tunnels." "I don't remember ever chasing a tunnel; explain to me who the enemy is!" the deputy chief of staff was asked by the chairman of the Zehut Party during a meeting of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, and gave no answer.

Tel Aviv had already been shelled for more than a month, but the senior command was unable to answer the question "who is the enemy" even during wartime.

At first the Netanyahu government issued instructions, as usual, to carry out air strikes, and when these did not help, and the rocket fire only increased, the decision was made again of a very limited ground entry. Without a clear strategic objective, IDF soldiers entered the area of destruction prepared by Hamas[67], an area that included many mazes of tunnels and a series of booby-trapped structures. Thus, between the anvil of an apologetic "ethics" of fighting ‐ ethics of conquerers in a foreign land[68], and the limitation of fighting in ranges and intensities that would prevent the fall of the Hamas regime at any price (so that we would not have to give up the Oslo concept and go back to controlling Gaza) and the hammer of an uninhibited enemy that knows well how to exploit the Israeli moral weakness and our inability to win, the IDF soldiers found themselves in an impossible situation.

The Israeli bombardment and shelling caused great damage and suffering to the civilian population, but the actual rule of Hamas was carefully protected by Israel, and in the end, as in Lebanon, it was Israel that was looking for ways to reach a cease-fire. And when it went unanswered, it ceased fire unilaterally.

The price of Operation Tzuk Eitan, created as a result of the abduction of the youths, which was created as a result of the Shalit deal, who was abducted in the Gaza Strip, which we abandoned in the disengagement plan, resulted in the deaths of 73 civilians (including 5 civilians) and 2,271 wounded (837 civilians). Of course, since the operation, the rocket fire has resumed, tunnel mining has resumed, and Hamas' military capabilities have been restored[69].

One of the new characteristics of Operation Tzuk Eitan was a parallel civil uprising by many Israeli Arabs. In the past, Israeli Arabs have been careful to keep quiet in times of war. The weakness that was revealed in Hatzok Eitan ignited an uprising among Israeli Arabs, especially the Arabs of East Jerusalem.

On 29 October 2014, an Arab resident of the Abu Tor neighborhood attempted to assassinate Temple Mount activist Rabbi Yehuda Glick[70], who was later elected to the 20th Knesset.

On 18 November 2014, two Arab murderers from Jabel Mukaber entered the Kehilat B'nai Torah synagogue in the Har Nof neighborhood (the westernmost neighborhood in the city). Using an ax and a butcher knife, the killers slaughtered 10 worshipers.

The fourth Netanyahu government
14 May 2015 ‐ today

During the fourth Netanyahu government, a new type of fighting – individual terror – was added to the variety of terror that we have grown accustomed to since the Oslo Accords.

The phenomenon of explosive belts and the previous terror networks, Israel managed to reduce by means of excellent intelligence, which enabled the prevention of most attacks before they were carried out. However, on Rosh Hashana 5775, Israel was exposed to a new phenomenon – a wave of spontaneous attacks without a central leadership and a deliberate hand that could be detected and neutralized.

The widespread incitement called on every Arab-Israeli or resident of Judea and Samaria – to decide independently and carry out a stabbing attack or a road attack. Every few hours, an Israeli was stabbed or run down by an Arab terrorists acting on his own, fighting against the Israeli "occupation". Over the course of half a year, Israel was stood helpless against the new wave of terrorism which claimed dozens of lives.

On Purim that year, after a terrorist stabbed a soldier in Hebron and initially seemed to have been neutralized by his comrades in the unit, the terrorist who committed the stabbing was liquidated by company medic Elor Azaria. B'Tselem, which filmed the liquidation of the wounded terrorist, distributed the video all over the world, and the daily wave of terrorism by individuals has immediately subsided.

The prosecution of Elor Azaria on charges of manslaughter, and his eventual conviction, returned the motivation to carry out the attacks, and at the same time severely damaged the sense of security of IDF soldiers in moments of truth during security incidents about the future support they would receive. These two sides brought about a new wave of terror attacks in Israel, accompanied by shameful phenomena of lack of contact.

The inability to recognize the terrorist as an enemy and to treat him accordingly, and the willingness to compare him to a regular criminal, is also a direct result of the Oslo concept, and is actually one of its biggest highlights.

Interim Summary
Returning from Oslo to identity

In the summer of 1993, the State of Israel and the "Palestine Liberation Organization" signed the Oslo Accords. The agreement included a mutual "recognition" and a declaration of an end to the violence between the sides.

Today, almost a quarter of a century later, it is possible to establish that Oslo has failed, because:

Terror has not ended, but rather the opposite. The number of terror victims in Israel has since jumped more than five times on a multi-year average, and terrorism has continued daily since then.
While Israel has recognized and still recognizes the "Palestinian people," and therefore also its right to a state of its own (although there is no such people, they are part of the Arab people, and say so), all the while these same "Palestinians" continue to refuse to recognize the right of the state of the Jewish people to exist as such.

This appendix reviewed the process and showed how, over the course of 24 years and ten governments, the Israeli public and its leaders have not been wise enough or courageous enough to look at reality and say: We were wrong, and we have to correct the mistake. All of the existing parties in the Knesset, including the "right wing", offer proposals that mean staying with the mistake and continuing with it. Zehut proposes to correct the mistake of Oslo, and offers an alternative way, another solution to our security problem, and to many other problems stemming from it in part, due to the enormous economic cost that the Oslo mistake continues to exact from us every day and every year since.

An examination of the sequence of terrorist incidents and rounds of fighting since the signing of the Oslo Accords until this day clearly shows how the agreements led to a serious deterioration in Israel's security and strategic situation.

Government ministers predict that within a year Israel will be dragged into another round of fighting in Gaza. Without a strategic way of thinking other than Oslo, the process will lead to a new diplomatic plan along the lines of the disengagement, which in turn will lead to an escalation of violence and further deterioration of Israel's existential legitimacy.

The rise of a strong and decisive leader in the United States – a leader who has no opposition on the right, Russia's return to our northern border as a dominant factor under the leadership of a strong and determined leader as well, and, more importantly, the emerging alliance between the two leaders ‐ against an Israeli leader lacking an alternative strategy to Oslo, or any opposition on the right – creates a very dangerous situation for Israel.

The need to escape from the Oslo whirlpool that is swallowing Israel has become an existential necessity, and the political-security plan of the Zehut Party is the way to do so.

[66] Even before the abduction and murder of the three youths, police officer Baruch Mizrahi was murdered on the eve of the Seder by a terrorist who was released in the Shalit deal.

[67] Concerned about "international legitimacy" and "fear of harming innocent people," Israel was careful to warn the population of Gaza in advance of the IDF in such detail and thoroughness that enabled Hamas to know in advance where IDF soldiers were about to arrive and to prepare well for them.

[68] However, unlike the classic case of conquerors in a foreign country, where morality is not at the top of their priorities, We draw from our viewing ourselves as conquerers all possible moral conclusions, thus sacrificing the lives of our citizens and soldiers to the benefit of the enemy who seeks to destroy us. Such behavior is immoral.

[69] News 2, 31 January 2017

[70] The presence of Zehut Chairman Moshe Feiglin at the same event, and the pressure he then exerted on Knesset members from all coalition factions to respond to the assassination attempt by ascending to the Temple Mount, began the countdown to the end of his tenure as a Likud MK.