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Part Six - The Freedom of the Citizen and Internal and External Security
Part Two - Israel's security
National Security Concept
Resolution and victory instead of "containment" and "rounds"
In a country that arose after the Holocaust and whose citizens are still being murdered because they are Jews, the ethos of security is fundamental. The public has a healthy instinct for security and common sense, but usually lacks the tools to recognize and understand modern military technology[10], security and war. He lacks the tools to separate prejudice, facts, lessons, and constructive criticism of the defense establishment. The public is forced to rely on experts, ostensibly of high rank, products and beneficiaries of the system, which perpetuates itself, its friends, and its not infrequently erroneous perceptions.
The resounding failure of the defense establishment to maintain the level of security that we were accustomed to before the Oslo Accords - to keep the home front outside the cycle of fighting, without security guards everywhere, without missiles aimed at our homes, without tunnels, and without a nuclear threat – this failure requires fundamental correction. But this correction is not possible at this time, because the "containment" school of thought has replaced that of decisive victory, and any attempt to turn back the clock threatens the careers of members of a widespread elite which were built around the "peace" industry of the Oslo Accords[11].
The ethos of security has also been loaded with a host of interests and values that have nothing to do with security. The army is not meant to be an arena for social struggles. It is not supposed to educate, not supposed to create "gender equality," not supposed to broadcast new programs and interpretations, and not supposed to create "equality of burden."
The IDF is intended to serve only one purpose: to create a formidable deterrent against an attack on the State of Israel, and if deterrence is not enough - to decisively defeat the enemy as fast as possible, with the fewest Israeli casualties. The IDF must do so at such a price to the enemy that it will create a new deterrent against another "round" for as many decades as possible. It is quite possible. For example, since the cease-fire agreement following the Yom Kippur War, and until the Syrian regime collapsed, there was total quiet in the Golan for 36 consecutive years. The regimes in Egypt and Jordan also agreed to peace with Israel only after they suffered crushing military defeats by the IDF.
Given the enormous financial and human capital invested in the IDF, we have the right to demand that it focus on what is essential, and to give maximum value for the investment.
In order to produce this same army, efficient and high quality, which defeats Israel's enemies quickly and efficiently, saves lives and money, deters and paves the way for peace, the IDF must rehabilitate the value system it has lost since the Oslo Accords. Inverting the traditional values of the military from victory to containment, and abandoning the most basic principles of war, such as a concerted effort to win decisively, has led to huge budgetary waste, damage to the IDF's training and combat capability, loss of the ability to win, and many unnecessary sacrifices.
It is possible, for example, to invest enormous resources in many Iron Dome batteries and deploy large forces around the Gaza Strip, as well as on flights over it and in the sea beyond it. One can try to "contain" the threat every minute of every day for years. On the other hand, it is possible to win the battle and eliminate the enemy. In any campaign in which we rely on "containment" as a strategy, we will continue not to win, and we will continue to "absorb" attacks and losses.
The IDF of today no longer strives for victory. Victory is no longer in its conceptual world, because the society that sent it on its mission no longer believes in the justice of its own existence, to say nothing of its right to decisively defeat its enemies.
The IDF strives for containment. But the containment perpetuates the state of legitimacy of violence against Israel and undermines Israel's legitimacy in the world, and even in the home. It requires a much larger quantity of forces and resources, which will never be enough, leads to a larger number of dead and wounded, year after Year, without end, and ensures the next war, under tougher conditions.
The loss of the value of victory and the pursuit of it has led to the fact that senior military commanders, rather than give the political echelon confidence in the possibility of backing their policies through the IDF, are doing the exact opposite. An example of this behavior was given, for example, when based on recorded evidence[12] of former Security Minister Ehud Barak, it turns out that it was the military echelon and not the civilian leadership that prevented the attack and destruction of the nuclear facilities in Iran There are many other examples, public statements of generals and chiefs of staff, which indicate that they are fixated on the "containment" approach, and reject outright the possibility of decisively winning, even when it is offered to them. There are also examples of this in the area of internal security. For example, the Shin Bet's objection to outlawing of the Islamic Movement in Israel, against the political echelon, which unanimously decided to do so.
On the eve of the Six-Day War, Israel faced an immediate existential threat. The IDF planned to launch the entire air force at once and attack Egyptian air force bases, and only afterwards "to start" the war, after it had already been decided in our favor with the opening blow. The heads of the defense establishment radiated self-confidence and high morale. At one point, they even threatened to resign if they were not allowed to attack because they knew that if we continued to wait until the Arab armies attacked first, the price in blood would be heavy and Israel would be in serious danger. Thus each side performed its true role. The civilian leadership weighed all the considerations, and finally decided, and the military leadership, ready and determined to fight, gave the leaders of the nation the confidence and the tools to carry out that decision.
Time after time it becomes clear to us that today the situation has reversed itself, and even when the civilian leadership already understands that there is no alternative but to attack, and to win decisively, it is the generals of the army and the security forces who not only do not push forward, but on the contrary, block the leaders.
This reached its climax when Deputy Chief of Staff Maj. Gen. Golan, in his Holocaust Martyrs ‘and Heroes' Remembrance Day speech (2016), placed Israeli society and the IDF on a level with the Nazi army and warned against similar developments. This was not a gaffe, but the desired result of a years-long indoctrination of IDF officers and fighters by means of external organizations, some supported by the New Israel Fund, which undermine the foundations of Israeli identity and justice, prevent the enemy from being identified as such, and uproot the element of victory from IDF discourse.
The way to build an efficient and victorious army is first and foremost through rehabilitation and building up the values of the army. Only on the basis of correct values will it be possible:
To produce a proper combat strategy.
To derive from it correct combat tactics, and a supportive moral framework, without legal intervention during operations, and full legal support for soldiers.
To recruit only those who are really needed, while providing fair wages in accordance with the volunteer army idea which Zehut is advancing.
To provide the equipment that best suits operational requirements, without the influence of foreign elements in the form of money from foreign countries.
Full professional training that conforms to the operational requirements in every sector and in every corps, so that every soldier will have long-term professional capability in his position.
Defining the purpose of all combat as decisive defeat of the enemy. In this framework, the enemy being combatted will be defined as people or organizations or states, and not weapons such as terror tunnels and rockets, and defining the achievements that must be reached at the end of the fighting.
If the above conditions are met, it will be possible to achieve victory in practice.
An entire generation of commanders and soldiers grew into a world of "postmodern" concepts of "narratives" - a world without truth and lies, good and evil, and therefore there can be no justice, no beginning and end, and certainly no victory.
And when there is no victory, the war never ends, and when the war does not end, peace can not begin either.
[10] Most Israeli citizens know that we have excellent military-technological capabilities, but are not familiar with the details, even though they are publicized from time to time.
[11] An examination of the details of the deterioration in the security and strategic situation of the State of Israel has been detailed in the Appendix "Israel's Security from Oslo to the Present".
[12] Source: http://www.mako.co.il/news-military/security-q3_2015/Article-1cd02b99ac05f41004.htm.
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